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A review of some of the current literature pertaining
to this thesis is conducted. The Created Response Surface
Technique of solving a class of nonlinear mathematical
programs is presented. The theoretical interpretations
of the primal and dual formulations of the technique in
an activity analysis context are developed. The applica-
bility of these interpretations to the neoclassical theory
of the firm and the contemporary organization theory is
indicated. Computational experience in solving well de-
fined numerical problems is also indicated. Several lin-
ear models of organizational decentralized planning are
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. REVIEW OF NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
In this thesis the neoclassical theory of the firm and
contemporary organization theory are extended by the appli-
cation of a nonlinear programming technique known as the
Created Response Surface Technique (CRST) . For ease of
understanding, the reader is expected to have a basic
grasp of the neoclassical theory of the firm, the static
economic theory of market equilibrium, and from the mathe-
matical disciplines the classical theory of optimization
including Lagrange multipliers and mathematical program-
ming. This introduction contains a brief review of the
neoclassical theory of the firm and a description of the
background motivating this thesis.
In neoclassical economic theory a firm, or producer,
is an economic agent who consumes some commodities and pro-
duces other commodities. It is usual to embed the pro-
ducer in an economy characterized by scarce resources. By
the interaction of consumers and producers in markets,
commodities which are goods or services are valued as
scarce, free, or noxious. More specifically, the firm
technologically transforms inputs, factors of production
which are purchased in markets, into outputs, products
which are sold in markets. In making choices the firm con-
siders consumers' and other producers' demand for its out-
puts, the state of production technology and the behavior

of the market where it purchases its inputs and sells its
outputs. The firm is usually assumed to behave as if it
maximized its profit. In this case profit is the differ-
ence between the total revenue received from the sale of
its outputs and the total costs incurred in the production
of those outputs.
In a perfectly competitive economy a market mechanism
establishes prices for all commodities including the firms
inputs and outputs. The firm is assumed to accept these
prices as given datum determined in the market (atomistic
competition) and to pursue some form of optimizing behav-
ior. This behavior can be described by three different
behavioral models. First, there is the maximization of
physical output subject to a cost constraint. Second,
there is the economic dual formulation of that model, the
minimization of total cost subject to an output constraint.
And finally, there is the maximization of profit, which




If the production, cost and profit functions are suf-
ficiently well behaved, 2 mathematical programming techniques
can be applied to these models. The application of mathe-
matical programming techniques to these problems usually
1
Henderson, J. M. , and Quandt , R. P., Microeconomic
Theory
,
p. 53, McGraw-Hill, 1958.
2
Kuhn-Tucker Constraint Qualification, Reference,
Appendix A, paragraph 9.

results in decision rules which characterize an optimum.
If the functions or their approximations are sufficiently
mathematically tractable, numerical solutions can be
achieved.
B. DECENTRALIZATION PLANNING PROCEDURES
1 . General Model
In neoclassical theory the firm is modeled as if
it were an homogeneous entity. Mathematical functions
represent the firm's aggregate behavior ex cathedra in the
economy. The decision rules derived from these models in-
dicate the necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve
optimal behavior.
Several models have been proposed which describe
how the firm pursues the optimum behavior once the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for that optimum behavior
have been established. One model proposed by E. Malinvaud
[1]* considers the firm's pursuit of optimum behavior to
be a sequential decentralized planning procedure. This
model is representative of a general class of decentral-
ization models and will be presented to introduce the
basic concepts and the pertinent assumptions underlying
such decentralized planning models.
This model characterizes a firm which is suffi-
ciently large to have such organizational subunits as a
central agency and at least one production agency, denoted




by j where j = 1,...,J. It is supposed that the central
agency is responsible for formulating a plan for opti-
mizing the behavior of the entire firm. Assume that the
central agency can forecast the aggregate demand for the
firm's products over a time period in which technology
may be considered constant. Further suppose that the cen-
tral agency knows the quantities of available inputs and
the entrepreneur's preferences, which may be represented
by a utility function, but it does not know the specific
technical information which describes the actual produc-
tion process. This specific information is known by pro-
duction agencies
,
but each specific production agency does
not know the entrepreneur's preferences, the availability
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agencies, if they exist in the firm. Clearly, some method
should be used to allow the production agency to provide
its specific technological information in the central
agency's formulation of the plan. Although the formula-
tion of the plan is in reality a continuous process, it
is assumed that this plan will be created over a time
period in which these exchanges of information between
the central agency and the production agencies will form
an iterative procedure. 3
This iterative procedure is assumed to be accom-
plished in discrete stages. Each stage is denoted by s,
3
This conclusion presupposes some form of administra
tive regulation governing how information is exchanged and
some requirement for minimum content of the information ex
changed.

s = 1,...,S. The central agency provides "prospective in-
dices", I
,
a vector consisting of J components at stage s
Each component of this vector is the "prospective index"
to each of the J production agencies at the s^h stage. A
prospective index is essentially a request for technolog-
ical information. It's form may be a production quota,
resource availability, or a budget constraint. For ex-
ample, the central agency may be asking, "What can you,
the j tn production agency, produce if you have "X" dollars
of budget available?" Each prospective index requires
some response from each of the production agencies. In
return, the production agencies provide a "proposal",
P
,
a vector consisting of J components at stage s. Each
OlupuliCllU Ox tiiu krCCuOI 1 _< a. n c 1 1 " -*--*^/-*m r*no r* -P •f~Tn-
J production agencies. A proposal implicitly provides the
specific technical information embedded in the j tn produc-
tion agency. For example, the j th production agency may
be responding, "Given "X" dollars of budget, I can produce
"Y" units of my specific output." Each mutual exchange of




will denote the "plan" after the s^*1 stage.



























Analogous to the characteristics of the simplex
algorithm of linear programming, any iterative procedure
can be studied to understand which characteristics it ex-
hibits. The following is a partial list of possible
cedure could be well defined. That is, if at each stage
of the process solutions exist to the "prospective indices",
"proposals" and the "plan", the procedure is well defined.
Secondly, the procedure could be monotonic. If the utility
of the s^- iteration is at least as great as the utility of
the s-l st iteration, the process will be monotonic. Next,
the procedure could be convergent. If, as S increases
beyond bound, the utility of the s tJl iteration approaches
some least upper bound of the set of utilities defined over
all feasible plans, the procedure will be convergent. Fin-
ally, the procedure could be finite. If the "plan" after
the s^-*1 iteration is the optimal plan for some finite num-
ber S, the procedure will be finite. If the procedure is
11

not finite, it is assumed that the central agency will
establish an upper bound on the number of iterations of
the process. In reality, the time and cost of each ex-
change of information will tend to constrain the process.
Some optimization technique is indicated and would be
appropriate. This optimization technique will not be
discussed, but it may provide an area for future interest.
3. Walrasian Tatonnement Process
As an example of iterative planning procedure,
consider the neoclassical Tatonnement (recontracting)
process of static market equilibrium. A perfectly com-
petitive market might consist of an auctioneer, customers,
and producers (production agencies) who are assumed to
the consumers and producers yields market equilibrium (the
plan) by the Walrasian price adjustment mechanism. The
price adjustment mechanism acts as • a stopping rule signi-
fying the termination of the iterative procedure and
achievement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for
market equilibrium. The procedure starts when the auc-
tioneer, real or pedagogical, provides a price vector
(prospective index) of all the commodities in the market
to consumers and producers. This initial vector may be
based on past performance of the market or "judgment".
The consumers seek to maximize their individual
utility subject -to a budget constraint generated by the
prices of commodities in their prospective commodity
12

bundles and their initial endowment. The quantities of
goods and services the consumers are willing to buy at
the existing prices form the aggregate demand at this
iteration.
Concurrently, producers seek to maximize their
individual profits. Since profit is a function of inputs
and outputs, the existing prices allow firms to determine
the quantities of their respective outputs they are willing
to produce. The vector of these quantities (proposal) is
the aggregate supply at this iteration.
If consumer demand for the j*-*1 product at the s^
iteration, denoted by D
.
, exceeds production supply of
-* J
the j tn product of the s tn iteration, denoted by S . , or
** J
adjust the appropriate prices to account for the excess
demand or supply. The iterative procedure continues until
the market is cleared, D - S = 0~, at an equilibrium
' s s
^
price, indicating that the plan is optimal.
13

II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Activity analysis is the synthesis of mathematical
programming and the economic theory of the firm. When
mathematical programming techniques are applied to well
defined behavioral models of the firm, the optimum solu-
tion to the programming formulation of that model yields
appropriate managerial decision rules which characterize
that optimum solution. Likewise, if numerical data is
used in a practical model of the firm, the optimum solu-
tion to the programming formulation of that model will
indicate how that optimum solution may be achieved with
that data.
Historically the theoretical and practical applica-
tions of activity analysis to well defined resource al-
location problems appear to have developed as a hybrid of
research in both disciplines. The introduction of a
mathematical programming technique is generally followed
by the application and interpretation of that technique
in an economic context.
Whether or not a cause-effect relationship actually
exists is not conjectured. Rather, this apparent sequence
will be used to provide topic continuity in reviewing some
of the principal research efforts in areas which directly
relate to this thesis.
The first known model of an economy which introduced
technological production in characterizing a general economic
14

equilibrium was developed by J. von Neumann [2] in 1937.
The model treated technological coefficients, outputs, and
production processes as known entities. Activity levels,
prices, the coefficient of expansion of the entire economy
(scale of the economy) and the interest factor of the
economy were considered unknown entities. The model could
accomodate the concepts of joint production, capital goods
depreciation, and scarce or free goods. Employing the
Minimax criterion of Games Theory, von Neumann proved the
existence of at least one solution to the coefficient of
expansion and the interest factor as functions of prices
and activities. At optimality, the solution to the model
uniquely equates the coefficient of expansion to the in-
terest factor. The equality of these implicit functions
of prices and activity levels characterize the equilibrium
conditions of the economy in perfect competition.
During World War II the allocation of resources in
multi-theatre military operations and in the domestic
economy generated interest in mathematical models of de-
finitive planning procedures. A landmark in the research
effort in linear function analysis was G. B. Dantzig's [3]
introduction of the simplex algorithm in 1947.
T. C. Koopman's [4] immediate appreciation for the
variety of allocation problems which could be modeled by
procedures similar to the simplex algorithm resulted in
the emphasis on activity analysis at the Cowles Commission
for Research in Economics Conference of 1951. The priiary
15

purpose of this conference was to consolidate the results
of various independent research efforts which had been
addressing similar problems in an activity analysis con-
text .
In a recent book, D. C. Vandermeulen [5] describes
the foundations and origin of the simplex algorithm and
its application to the neoclassical theory of the firm.
The iterative procedure of the algorithm is interpreted
as a model of the rational economic behavior of an hypo-
thetical entrepreneur. The decision rules governing
optimization of a defined production objective are dem-
onstrated. The economic analysis of complementary
slackness conditions and the applicability of the dual
4.11 iiuUx atxuh v-' J. w I J. ^ nl ^ v* ^ j- a J. V ui v Juli L^U,
In 1950 H. Kuhn and A. Tucker [6] formulated the
necessary and sufficient conditions which characterize
the saddle point of a two person zero sum game and applied
those conditions to a class of nonlinear inequality con-
strained programming problems. Under appropriate dif-
ferentiability and nonnegativity assumptions, it was shown
that the maximum of a concave objective function over a
convex set defined by inequality constraints was equivalent
to the saddle value of the Lagrangian function of that pro-
gramming problem. The interpretation of the Kuhn-Tucker
results when applied to economic theory was consistent
with concurrent economic research efforts.
In 1961, R. Pfouts [7] applied the Kuhn-Tucker neces-
sary conditions to a convex problem formulation of cost and
16

production in the multi-product firm in a perfectly com-
petitive economy. In this formulation, the multi-product
firm was modeled as a homogeneous economic entity rather
than an aggregation of single product firms, as in the
Hicksian model. This approach characterized each pro-
duct as competing for a portion of the total amount of
fixed factors of production (long run sense) assessing
a "set-up" or transfer cost for changes in product mix
which required corresponding changes in the allocation
of the fixed factors between periods (short run) . Levels
of the variable factors of production (short run sense)
were assumed to change with the output level.
The model seeks to minimize a total cost function
constrained by technology and continuity of fixed factor
allocation to specific products. The convex problem is
solved by applying the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions
yielding the following results at equilibrium. Consis-
tent with the Hicksian model, the imputed value of mar-
ginal output must be at least as great as the marginal
costs of that output. But additionally, the imputed value
of the reallocation of fixed resources from one product
to another must at least be equal to the value of the in-
creased marginal product resulting from the change minus
the cost associated with the marginal transfer of those
fixed resources. Thus, only when an excess of all fixed
factors exists can the multi -product firm be considered
an aggregation of single product firms.
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Four years later, T. Naylor [7] expanded Pfouts anal-
ysis of the multi-product firm in a competitive economy to
a monopolistic-monopsonistic economy. Maintaining Pfouts'
concept of a multi-product model, Naylor optimizes the
economic dual of that model. At equilibrium the decision
rules characterizing the optimum substantiated Pfouts'
previous conclusions.
In 1958, G. Dantzig and P. Wolfe [9] introduced a
decomposition principle for linear programs. The princi-
ple is applicable to programs which have some constraints
which "bind" together various sets of constraints which
are independent of each other. The original problem is
decomposable into subprograms, a characterization of each
inu.epenu.ent constraint, snu a master program, an aggro -
gation of the subprograms. A full master program is formed
from the convex combinations of all the extreme points of
the feasible regions of each of the independent constraints.
Each basic feasible solution to the master problem generates
dual variables. A function of the dual variables establishes
an optimality criterion for the value of the master program
objective function. If this criterion is not met for any
one or more of the independent subproblems, the subprogram
for that constraint set is optimized providing a new vec-
tor to enter the basis and generating a new basic feasible
solution to the master program. This procedure continues
iteratively until the optimality criterion is achieved for
all independent subprograms or it is evident an optimal
solution does not exist.
18

In 1958, L. Hurwicz [10] describes the "greed process"
as a model of information decentralization for a class of
decomposable economic environments. In this context de-
composable means free of external (dis) economies of scale.
The "greed process" embodies the intuitive concept of de-
composition because each economic agent is assumed to be
concerned with his actions alone, even though this may be
against his economic best interests in the operation of the
system. Each agent lacks any knowledge of the internal
functioning of other agents in the economy. Hurwicz proves
that the "greed process", the interaction of these inde-
pendent economic agents, achieves Pareto optimal conditions
but requires more information to achieve these conditions
than the neoclassical competitive market mechanism. Al-
though this "greed process" is shown to be applicable to a
broader class of economic environments, it lacks the infor-
mational efficiency of the perfectly competitive mechanism
which decentralizes the economy by prices alone.
In 1963, Y. Ijiri [11] applied a special form of lin-
ear programming, "goal programming", to accounting models
of the firm. Goals may take the form of lower bounds on
production or upper bounds on input usage. The procedure
emphasizes the decomposition of definitive management goals,
which correspond directly to profit, into a set of subgoals
which are more tractable for subordinate agencies within
the firm. Management seeks to minimize the firms deviation
from the firm's goals. The deviations from the firm's goals
19

are an aggregate of the subordinate agencies' deviation
from their respective independent goals. If subordinate
goals are compatible, a case in which all goals can be
satisfied simultaneously, specific goal levels and devi-
ations from those levels are sufficient information to
decompose the firm and iteratively achieve an optimum
solution. If subordinate goals are incompatible, a case
in which all goals cannot be satisfied simultaneously
but some goals must be satisfied sequentially, Ijiri
proposes a "preemptive priority", an ordering of goal
achievement. Further, if there are several goals of the
same order, a weighting scheme can be used to provide
relative differentiation among goals of equal priority.
Utilizing a procedure similar to the simplex algorithm
of linear programming, the goals with the "lowest cost",
i.e., highest priority and weight, sequentially enter the
basis until an optimum solution for the existing priority
and weighting scheme is achieved.
Recently, T. Ruefli [12] analyzed resource allocation
in a three level firm by utilizing a generalized goal de-
composition model. The organization consists of a cen-
tral agency, management and operational units. Each level
is vertically interrelated by a specific information flow.
Levels of organization are assumed to be horizontally in-
dependent. The central agency seeks to maximize the im-
puted value of scarce resources subject to the allocation
of those resources to different managements. Managements
20

seek to minimize the deviations from these specified goals
subject to the productional relationship of their indepen-
dent operational units. Managements pass the shadow prices
of their goals to subordinate operating units and the cen-
tral agency. Each operating unit minimizes it's management's
imputed value of their (each operating unit's) production
activity subject to each operating unit's particular tech-
nology. Operating units propose activity levels at that
shadow price to their respective managements. Concurrently,
the central agency determines revised goals. Managements
sequentially determine revised shadow prices given these
new goals and new production activities. The procedure
continues iteratively until a desired optimum is achieved.
In j. 9 5 9
,
o. v^arrol l-^-^j propose^, tuc created Response
Surface Technique, a penalty function approach to the solu-
tion of nonlinear constrained mathematical programs which
modeled complex industrial processes. The technique
"created" a form of weighted penalty function from the
original objective function and original constraints. The
procedure seeks to optimize the unconstrained created func-
tion in a sequence of steepest ascent steps. Each itera-
tion of the procedure seeks the optimum to an artifical
objective surface. This optimum in turn generates another
artificial objective surface whose optimum value is sought.
As the number of iterations increase beyond all bound, the
artifical objective surface approaches the surface of the
original objective function and the artifical optimum ap-
proaches the original optimum. Throughout the procedure
21

feasibility is assured by a weighted "boundary-repulsion"
term which is sequentially reduced at each iteration.
In 1961, P. Wolfe [14] formulated a dual program for
a nonlinear, convex, dif ferentiable
,
primal, objective
function minimized over a convex constraint region.
Applying the Kuhn-Tucker Equivalence Theorem conditions
to the Lagrangian Function of the primal problem, Wolfe
proved the existence of the dual solution at optimality.
Also at optimality the values of the primal and dual ob-
jective functions are equal.
In 1968, M. Balnski and W. Baumol [15] interpreted
Wolfe's dual formulation to a nonlinear primal problem of
profit maximization constrained by technology in a com-
petitive economy. Maximization of a concave profit func-
tion subject to concave technological constraints resulted
in the dual minimization of a Lagrangian function consist-
ing of a fixed profit function, the value of unused re-
sources and the total marginal opportunity losses of all
outputs. The minimization of the dual objective function
minimized the value of unused resources and the total
marginal opportunity losses of all outputs. Regrouping
of terms in the dual objective function provides a mathe-
matical interpretation of economic rent which is the dif-
ference between total profit and the imputed value of all
inputs. The existence of economic rent is attributed to
the concave object function representing diminishing re-
turns. This assumption indicates that the imputed value
of inputs should be less than total profit.
22

In 1963, A. Fiacco and G. McCormick [16, 17, 18]
developed a modification of Carroll's Created Response
Surface Technique which solves a constrained, nonlinear
mathematical program in a sequence of unconstrained mini-
mization problems. The original programming problem is
to minimize a convex objective function subject to con-
cave constraints. A penalty function is formed from the
original objective function and constraints. The sequen-
tial unconstrained minimization of this form of penalty
function approaches the optimal value of the original
problem by iterative gradient search methods. A "boun-
dary repulsion" term insures feasibility from an interior
starting value. Primal-dual feasibility, recommendations
«-- w* C> s- -w* w* p W i> A. ww/iilb/ awaCJ.wii.UX •— - - -• w - ^ iW*»wt j O.lli. w -* ** <- i - »- >., i & w ^* j.
structure of the technique are presented.
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III. THE CREATED RESPONSE SURFACE TECHNIQUE
A. PROCEDURE DESCRIPTION
In activity analysis, mathematical programs are uti-
lized to model the economic activity of the firm. Cus-
tomarily, the model consists of an objective function, a
function of endogenous variables under the control of
management, and constraints, levels of exogenous variables
which are determined from the economic environment. As-
suming neoclassical rational behavior, the objective func-
tion is maximized or minimized, as appropriate within the
bounds defined by the constraints.
If the objective function and constraint equations
are linear functions, linear programming techniques may
be used to determine the appropriate decision rules or
levels of endogenous variables. If the objective func-
tion and constraint equations are nonlinear but separable
functions, separable programming techniques may be used to
solve the program. Similarly, quadratic programming
methods may be used if the objective function is quadratic
and the constraint equations are linear.
There are few developed techniques of solution for
those models which are not classified as linear, quadratic,
or separable. However, an auxiliary function method has
been developed for this class of models. The general ob-
jective of this approach is to transform the original con-
strained problem into an unconstrained "auxiliary function"
which may be optimized by several available techniques. The
24

auxiliary function incorporates the objective function and
constraint equations of the original problem.
One particular class of auxiliary functions consists
of the original objective function and a penalty term
which algebraically contributes a penalty for violation
of the constraints of the original problem. This penalty
term may be logarithmitic or reciprocal-linear depending
on the particular model. The intent of this penalty func-
tion approach is to insure that the number of infeasible
solutions is decreased as the procedure approaches the
optimum of the auxiliary function. The optimum of the
auxiliary function will be the optimum of the original
objective function if the procedure is convergent.
"^h" ^'"Gti f
n
^ Do c •r>'->T^o o Surface r^'echni n ue 13^ is one
form of the penalty function approach to the auxiliary
solution of a constrained mathematical program.
As an explanation of this technique, consider the
following problem:
(A)
MAX: f (Xt • • »x. • • «x,)




f(x) is a concave function with continuous first and
second partial derivatives.
g. (x) for i = 1,...,I are concave functions with con-
tinuous first and second partial derivatives.
25

The constraint region formed by the g-(x) for i = 1,...,I
is a convex region. If the nonnegativity of the dependent
variables is required, these would be included as addition-
al constraint equations, ( i = 1 + 1 , . . . , I+J) , in the problem
The created response function problem for (A) is:
(B) IEw.—
i = l gi(x) - k.
The elements of this function are:
1. Created response function: P(x,r)
2. Objective function: f(x)
3. i*- constraint equation: g. (x) > k.
4. i tn constraint level: k.
l
r a th _~„4.,~^„„t J«v-S *** r*r\ • 1 fa Cy} - V
6. i^ subjective weighting






i g-(x) k.i=l 6 i v ^ i
8. Penalty term weighting
factor
:
r ; r > .
The original constrained maximization problem has been
transformed to an unconstrained maximization problem. Sev-
eral methods are available to perform this unconstrained
maximization. The second order gradient search method will
be used because of its proven computational efficiency. 1*
k
Fiacco, A. and McCormick, G., "Computation Algorithm
For the Sequential Unconstrained Minimization Technique for
Nonlinear Programming," Management Science , Vol. 10, No. 4,
p. 607, July 1964.
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Intuitively, the maximization of the created response
function should decrease the value of the weighted penalty
term relative to the value of the objective function. The
procedure seeks to maximize the function and avoid the
bounds of the constraint region simultaneously. If any one
constraint approached its binding value, g-(x) = k., the
penalty term would increase beyond bound. As the weighting
factor of the penalty term, r, is sequentially reduced to
zero, the procedure will allow constraints to become "more
binding" in the sense of approaching their respective boun-
dary values. In the limit, the value of the optimum of the
created response function approaches the value of the opti-
mum to the original problem.
Assume that the I subjective weighting factors have
been assigned. Starting the procedure with an initial fea-
sible point, x , and initial value of r, r
x ,
a response
surface, P(x,r.) , is created. The second order gradient
search method seeks the optimum value of that response
surface starting at x
x
. The optimum value of P(x,r )
yields a new starting point, x
2
. P(x,r ), where r 2 < rp
is a new created response surface whose optimum value, x
3 ,
is found by using second order search starting at x 2 . Then
r, is chosen with r. < r, and the process continues. Each
3 3 *




the optimal value of the £ tn created response surface ap-
proaches the optimum value of the original problem. 5
B. PRIMAL FORMULATION
1 . Practical Application
The Created Response Surface Technique exhibits
several characteristic properties which indicate the fea-
sibility of practical applications of the technique in
activity analysis. The following description of these
properties will be used to sketch the procedure's poten-
tial application and to state these properties without the
rigorous proofs developed in References [16, 17, 18].
The Created Response Surface Technique could be
used to solve models of complex production processes with-
out requiring that linear, quadratic, or separable con-
ditions be met. Linear models assumed constant returns to
scale. Nonlinear models could permit production functions
which demonstrate increasing, constant, or decreasing re-
turns to scale over the range of the endogenous variables.
Linear models assumed production processes were independent
and in fixed proportion; nonlinear models could introduce
the interactive effects of different production processes
at various levels of mix which could not be described by
quadratic or separable functions.
5
Fiacco, A. and McCormick, G., "The Sequential Uncon-
strained Minimization Technique for Nonlinear Programming,
A Primal-Dual Method," Management Science , Vol. 10, No. 2,
p. 361, January 1964.
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The convergence of the optimal values of (A) and
(B) is assured in the limit. The stability, which is the
local improvement of the created response function at each
iteration, provides assured improvement of the objective
function for a finite number of iterations of the procedure,
A criterion for local improvement from an initial starting
point may be achieved.
Constraint feasibility is assured in all itera-
tions of the procedure. Although this characteristic may
require an increased number of iterations to reach a solu-
tion which may be achieved in less iterations by permitting
temporary infeasibility , the temporary infeasibility may
be economically uninterpretable in the context of the orig-
inal problem.
By utilizing gradient search techniques to opti-
mize the created response function, local improvement for
each value of r is achieved. Assuming that the response
surface is well behaved, changes in the values of the en-
dogenous variables should reflect local changes during each
iteration. These endogenous variables may represent phy-
sical production processes. Minor changes in these pro-
cesses represent "local" improvement which may be less
costly to introduce them than massive changes required if
the global optimum is achieved indirectly without inter-
mediate steps. The intermediate "optimum" values of the
variables generated by each iteration of the search tech-




The procedure establishes primal-dual bounds on
the optimal solution of the original problem at each itera-
tion. Dual feasible points are generated from the optimal
value of each created response function. The value of the
dual objective function becomes an upper bound, and the
value of the created response function becomes a lower bound
for the optimal value. 6 As the number of iterations in-
crease beyond bound both upper and lower bounds converge
to the optimal value of the original objective function.
This property is useful for establishing a criterion for
achieving a desired accuracy for an approximation to that
optimal solution since the number of iterations usually
are restricted by transaction cost or time considerations.
The procedure may be useful when applied to an
original problem which does not observe the requisite con-
vexity assumptions. Practical applications to nonconvex
problems indicate excellent results. 7
2 . Theoretical Application
Rational economic behavior, in a neoclassical con-
test, is optimizing behavior. The entrepreneur is modeled
as maximizing profit or output or minimizing cost. Embedded
in a perfectly competitive economy, the neoclassical entre-
preneur possesses perfect information as well as the as-




Fiacco and McCormick, op. cit., p. 610
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generated by perfect information. He selects the one al-
ternative that is optimal for his well defined utility-
function.
Rational economic behavior in a contemporary con-
text, proposed by Simon and March, [19], is "satisficing"
behavior. The contemporary manager does not possess per-
fect information, a well defined utility function, or the
computational capacity of the neoclassical entrepreneur.
The contemporary manager seeks to discover satisfactory
alternatives which at least meet or perhaps exceed an es-
tablished criterion. He seeks to choose an alternative
from those discovered. Only on rare occasions will he
seek an optimum alternative in the neoclassical sense be-




The Created Response Surface approach is adapt-
able to both the neoclassical and contemporary theories of
the firm. Several standard economic interpretations of the
terms of the created response function are presented to
demonstrate this adaptability.
The objective function, f (x) , may represent any
one of the many forms of functional descriptions of a firm's
effectiveness which the firm desires to improve. f(x) may
describe profit, output, or some representation of effi-
ciency or utility.
8




The constraint levels, k., may represent input
resources or output goals. As an input constraint level,
k., would be an upper bound on the resource usage. An an
output constraint level, k., would be a lower bound or
minimum acceptable production goal for the i tn product.
The function, g-(x), may represent the manner in
which each of the I resources are utilized or goals are
achieved in the production process. Grouped in matrix
form those constraints which are upper bounded by input
resource levels, -g-(x) > -k. represent how some or all
of the J production processes use the i tn input resource.
Similarly, those constraints which are lower bounded by
minimum production goals, g. (x) > k. , represent how some
q y ^> 1 1 o f £ h e r,rocs <; S6S interact to produce the ^rn o^ti-
put goal
.








g.(x) for i = 1 , . .
.





g-(x) for i = k+l,...,I is a functional represen-
tation of resource utilization.
The subjective weighting factor for each of the I
constraints embodies the decision maker's subjective concern
for each constraint relative to the other constraints. In
this sense, the decision maker's concern is an expression of
the relative importance that the i tn constraint equation be
binding. Interpreted as a positive priority number the low-
est value w. would depict the decision maker's highest sub-
jective concern for that constraint compared to all other
constraints. This explicit priority structure causes the
Created Response Surface Technique to "accomodate" the higher
priority constraint boundaries sooner in the iterative pro-
cess .
This ordering may represent a form of utility func-
tion over a finite commodity space consisting of inputs and
outputs. Assigned a priori^ the revealed priorities describe
how a decision maker trades off between the i tn input usage
and the i^-*1 constraint level, or between the i tn production
and the i^*1 output goal.
The reciprocal deviation term for each of the I con-
straints is a measure of distance which corresponds to a re-
ciprocal "amount" of deviation from each specified production
goal or resource level. When the weighted individual recip-
rocal deviation terms are aggregated to form a penalty term,
this concept of distance is not clear. In a two constraint
input case, i = 1,2, the penalty term is
33

i k.-g.(x)i=l 1 6 i v J





(x)) (k fgl (x))










p = 2 is the usual Euclidean measure.
The penalty term weighting factor, r may represent
the decision maker's concern for the penalty term relative
to the objective function. In a production context, assume
that f (x) represents an internal index of productivity as a














f(x) is a concave function with continuous first
and second partial derivatives.
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g^( x ) i = l,...,k is a concave function with con-
tinuous first and second partial derivatives.
g^(x) i = k+l,...,I is a convex function with con-
tinuous first and second partial derivatives.
Applying the Created Response Surface Technique formulation
the primal problem becomes
:
MAX: P(x,r) = f(x)-r
r k i
y w i y wi
where
w. > are assigned a priori
r > such that r, > r, >•••> r .
1 2 e
Solving the Created Response Surface Technique formulation,












df (x) represents the internal marginal index of pro-
8x. ductivity.








The necessary conditions of the created response function
generated for each value of r,r , indicate that the marginal
productivity of the j tn activity will equal the marginal cost
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of that activity. In the context of this model, the margin-
al cost of the j th activity is a marginal opportunity cost.
In this sense the marginal opportunity cost represents the
incremental productivity foregone for an incremental change
in the j tn activity operating all the remaining J-l activi-
ties at their present levels. This incremental change in
the j th activity is represented by its weighted marginal
contribution to resource utilization and by its weighted
marginal contribution to output production. In each case,
the weights reflect an amount of resource underemployment
or production goal overachievement which conveys a sense
of inefficiency. Inefficiency in this model is intended
in the narrow sense of failure to achieve the i tn production
tiO dx. U x l, w «a l, x -L J. x, w lh^ x. j.v_Owlaa^\_ j v. v ^ j- ^Aiit ex; cl«" xllux
cated by the decision maker's i^h subjective weighting fac-
tor .
As the value of r is sequentially reduced at each itera-
tion of the Created Response Surface Technique, r charac-
terizes this specific weighting of productivity relative
to its associated opportunity cost. For each value of r,
r. , a point on a productivity-opportunity cost hypersurface
is generated by the technique. As the number of iterations
increase beyond bound causing the value of r to approach
zero, the entire hypersurface is generated. Each point on
that surface represents the decision maker's subjective
trade off between productivity and its associated opportunity
cost as reflected by the different weighting factors, r , as






The computational convenience and economic inter-
pretation of the dual formulation of linear programs pro-
vides an alternative approach to the solution or analysis
of a primal linear model. In a similar fashion the dual
formulation of a primal nonlinear program may exhibit the
computational and theoretical relationships of primal-dual
linear programming theory.
Consider the dual formulation of (A)
:
I
MIN: G(x,A) = f(x) + £ A^g^x)-!^)
i=l
(D)
S.T. 9G(x,A) . _ , ,
—~
- u j - J- , . . . , o
O .A. •
J
A > x >
The elements of the dual problem are:
1. Dual objective function:
2. Primal objective function
3. i""1 deviation:









The minimization of the dual objective function sub-
ject to the specified necessary conditions should decrease
the value of the aggregate deviation relative to the value of
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the primal objective function. At optimality, the value of
the dual objective function should identically equal the
value of the primal objective function.
Generally, the solution of (D) may not provide the
computational convenience demonstrated in the linear primal-
dual relationship. The convexity assumptions of the primal
nonlinear problem are generally not present in the dual for-
mulation. The constrained optimization of the dual objec-
tive function is itself a class of nonlinear programs for
which few solution techniques are available.
2 . Theoretical Application
The dual formulation (D) may be solved implicitly
by utilizing the established primal-dual feasibility prop-
erty of the Created Response Surface Technique. The value
of A* is determined by equating the necessary condition for





The optimum value of x, x* , for each created response sur-
face generated by z^ value of r satisfies the necessary
condition of (B) . Each (5c*, r) generates a dual multiplier
X"(r|) such that (x* X (r *) ) is dual feasible satisfying the
dual necessary conditions and providing an upper bound for
the optimal value of (A) at the £ tn iteration. 9 As l in-
creases beyond bound then
9





) = G(x*,A(r*)) = f(x*) .
In the classical Lagrangian theory, the multiplier
is customarily interpreted as a "shadow price" or "inputed
value". At optimality the value of this multiplier is a
representation of the opportunity cost of a change in the
primal objective function in terms of a unit change in pro-
duction or resource level.
Similarly, \?(r ) may be interpreted as a shadow
J- jC
price. At the optimum value of the Created Response Func-
tion for the fia iteration, the value of A*(r ) represents
J- As
the amount of change in the Created Response Function for
a unit change in the it*1 goal deviation for i = 1 , . . . ,k
or in the it*1 resource usage for i = k+l,...,I.
As indicated previously, iterative solutions to
(B) for each value of r yield the following multiplier





1 l (giW-V 2
r w.
X*(r ) = &-J: i= k+l,...,I.
1 l (V gi (x)) 2
As an example of the theoretical interpretation of
the dual formulation of a nonlinear program, consider the
dual problem to (C)
.
k I











X > , u >
i = l,...,k (output goals)
i = k+l,...,I (input levels)
j = 1, . .
.
,J.
Solving the necessary conditions of (E) and substituting the
value of u. into (E) yields the following modification to
the problem.










Li=l i=k + l J
Intuitively, minimization of the dual objective func-
tion should cause a reduction in the value of each term in the
objective function. Because the minimization of the primal
objective function is not economically interpreted in the con-
text of this problem, assume that this term has reached its
optimal value and may be considered fixed.
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The second and third term of the dual objective
function represents the total imputed value of the k goal
deviations and the total imputed value of the I-k resource
deviations respectively. The minimization process seeks
to reduce the value of both terms. At optimality both
terms vanish. Viewed in a complementary slackness context,
either of the following groups of conditions may exist for

















i l , . . . , K
i = k+1 ,...,1
2. If i A, > i = !,...,! «2>g. (x) = k, i = 1 1
I
The third term of the dual objective function is a
composite term of marginal productivity and marginal oppor-





represents the internal marginal index
of productivity. The index of produc-
tivity is defined by f(x) which is a func-
tion of the activity levels.
3x
8g. (x) represents the total, imputed,
-s-i marginal value of output technology
L
j for the fctn iteration of the
Created Response Surface Technique
procedure.
3.
I i, 3g-(x) represents the total, imputed,
i=k+l i — marginal value of input tech-
nology for the £ tn iteration of





The difference of (2) and (3) represents the imputed mar-
ginal opportunity cost of the j tn activity level at the ft
iteration of the Created Response Surface Technique proce-
dure. Thus, the entire term represents the total, weighted
(by the level of the j tn activity), marginal, imputed bene-
fit of operating the j ^ activity.
Invoking the complimentary slackness conditions,















AI l 8x • 3x
.
i=k+l 3 J
If the j th activity is utilized at a positive level, the
marginal imputed opportunity cost of operating the j"1 ac-
tivity must equal the internal marginal index of produc-
tivity of operating the j"i activity.
(2) If
£ 3g (x) i 3g. (X) 3f(x)
) X- i ) X. i > r
Z-j i 3x. Z_. l 3x. 3x.




If the marginal imputed opportunity cost of operating the
1" Vi
j activity is strictly greater than the internal marginal
index of productivity, then the activity should not be uti-
lized at a positive level.
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IV. DECENTRALIZED PLANNING MODELS
A. INTRODUCTION
In contemporary organization theory, organizations with-
in an economy are characterized by a limited capacity to
accumulate and process technical production information at
a central level. Embedded in an economy of complex tech-
nologies of production, organizations are structured to pro-
vide the appropriate levels of specialization and division
of labor to generate information and to utilize production
processes to achieve specified organizational goals. Organ-
izational goals are of two types: internal and external.
Internal goals are those objectives motivating departmental
a aencies. External CToals are the organization's objectives
within an economy.
Assume that an hypothetical organization has defined
at least one external goal. Further assume that this or-
ganization is motivated to pursue the achievement of this goal
within the conditions imposed on organizational behavior by
the economy. In this thesis an organization will be con-
sidered decentralized if the coordinated achievement of in-
ternal, departmental goals specified by the organization's
central agency will achieve the external organizational
goals. It is assumed that this coordination is achieved
by a system of incentives, rewards, and penalties for in-
dividual and group behavior and by some goal defining pro-




In neoclassical theory the organization is modeled as
if the internal allocation of the organization's resources
among departmental agencies takes place in a perfectly com-
petitive internal economy. In this context internal goals
may be constrained output maximization or constrained cost
minimization. The departmental agencies act as independent
economic agents who purchase factors of production and pro-
vide the products which jointly achieve the organization's
external goal in an external economy. The central agency
acts as a consumer of departmental products and a producer
of departmental factors of production.
As in the recontracting model of static market equi-
librium, a competitive equilibrium is achieved in the factor
and commodity markets of the internal economy. The neces-
sary conditions which characterize this equilibrium in the
commodity market are that the central agency's rate of com-
modity substitution equals the rate of product transforma-
tion for each department. Likewise, in the factor market
the rates of commodity substitution for each of the J de-
partments equals the rate of product transformation of the
central agency. At optimality, the decentralization is
achieved by the price system which equates the quantities
of departmental outputs demanded by the central agency to
the quantities of outputs supplied by the J departments.
Recall that externalities, which are commodities for
which markets do not exist, are not present in a perfectly
competitive economy. In the absence of externalities, the
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price system provides the necessary information to decen-
tralize the organization.
B. LINEAR MODEL WITHOUT EXTERNALITIES
Several mathematical programming techniques have been
proposed to model the decentralization of an organization.
One model proposed by Dantzig -Wolfe [9] is representative
of this general class of decomposition algorithms. This
model will be presented to introduce the basic concepts of
decomposition and to demonstrate how behavioral models of
the agencies within an organization interact to achieve
optimal behavior by a sequential decentralized planning
procedure
.
Assume that a hypothetical organization consists of J
departments each \vrith a defined, independent, internal goal
The J departments are interrelated by their common utiliza-
tion of resources which are allocated to each of the J de-
partments in a perfectly competitive internal economy.
Further assume that the organization has at least one de-
fined external goal and desires to pursue this goal in the
external economy.


















p. is a vector (N.xl) of market prices pertaining to
the j tn department.
x. is a vector (N.xl) of the j tn department's activity
levels
.
A. is a matrix (M xN
.
) which describes how each of the
3 o r
j departments interact to utilize the organization
resources
.
b is a vector (M xl) of resources under the control of
o v o *
the control agency.
B. is a matrix (M xN
.
) of the independent constraints
under the control of the j th department.
b. is a vector (M.xl) of resources under the control of
3 3
the j tn department.
Assume that B.x. = b". defines a closed and convex set
3 3 3
for each j = 1,...,J such that x., a feasible point of the
jtn regi on> may b e written as a convex combination of the











Substituting the above conditions into the original








I pkj " 1
k=l
p"
k j > j
= 1,. . . ,J
k = l,...,Kj
The full master program has fewer constraints than the orig-
inal program, but it does nave more variables. The variables
of the full master program will be generated only as needed
in the solution procedure.
Let B^ * denote a basis to the full master program at






t = 1 T
where
b =
Then the dual variables to the full, master program may
be written as




pR is a vector (lxM +J) of prices associated with the
basic variables
a, is a vector (lxM )i o
a^ is a vector (lxJ)
.
o^ ' is the central agency's imputed value of an addi-
tional unit of each of the M resources. This vector is
o
generated from a basis consisting of vectors which represent
how some or all of the J departments are currently utilizing
an allocation of these common resources. This utilization
is imbedded in a .
a^ is the central agencies imputed value of the past
proposals of resource utilization from each of the J depart-
ments as reflected in the current basis, B 1- } .
a ^ ' is used as a prospective index at the t™ itera-
tion of the procedure. It represents the central agency's
request for production information.
After receiving this prospective index, each of the J
departments determine if their previous proposal of resource
utilization, their production plan, was optimal for the cen-
tral agency. This is accomplished by computing the following
criteria function with the information provided in the pro-
spective index,







x. * is the previous production plan of the
j
*-n department in the form of activity
levels
.
o\ J A.x. * is the central agency's imputed cost of
the j 1- department's resource utilization
for the previous production plan.
p.x. ' is the market value of the jth department's
production plan.
is the net profitability of all production
plans of the j tn department before the pre-
vious plan.
Thus criterion function is an expression of the net
profitability of the previous proposal of each of the J de-
partments .
If the j tn criterion function is nonnegative, this in-
dicates that the j th department is utilizing resources op-
timally reflecting a nonnegative economic profit. If the
minimum value of all J criterion functions is nonnegative,
this indicates that all departments are utilizing resources
optimally implying that the optimal resource allocation plan
for the organization has been achieved.
i
If the criterion function is negative for any of the
J departments, this indicates that these departments are
not utilizing resources properly and should "improve" their
production plans by providing a new proposal.
Assume that one criterion function is negative for some
j = e at the t tn iteration. This indicates that the e^h
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department is not utilizing resources in an optimal manner
for the organization. The e^h department generates a new





- p e )
xW + (t)
S.T. B x^ = b
e e e
e
Utilizing the standard simplex criterion, a new basis,
B^ , is formed in the full master program by the replace-
ment of an existing basis vector with q^ ' , a vector con-
structed from x , suitable for the dimension of the master
„,. . . , -(t+1) , -(t + 1)program. This new basis provides p^ * and a k .
At each iteration, t = 1,...,T, each department recal-
culates its criterion function. This recalculation by all
departments serves to indicate which departments have achieved
optimal production plans at this iteration and to provide a
check on previously optimal plans which may be adversly ef-
fected by subsequent reallocations of resources to other
nonoptimal departments.
If more than one criterion function is negative, the
department with the most negative criterion function should
generate a new proposal.
At each iteration of the procedure, only one department
is allowed to return a revised production plan. Each revised
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production plan generates a new master basis initiating
another optimality evaluation by all departments. The
iterations continue until the optimal solution to the full
master program is achieved. The optimal solution to the
full master program consists of the appropriate activity
levels for all J departments.
It should be noted that the optimal solution to the
full master program may contain more than one proposal
from some of the departments since this optimal solution
consists of M +J basic vectors of which there can exist
o
J unique individual proposals at most. Consistent with
the concept of decentralization presented in this thesis
it is assumed that if more than one proposal is optimal
for any department then the central agency will specify
the sequence of fulfilling these proposals.
This decomposition procedure may be initiated by
utilizing existing operating levels as a basis. If no such
basis exists, the artificial basis method of the revised
simplex algorithm may be used.





















o*^ * is the prospective index at the t^*1 iteration,
q^ J is the e^*1 departmental revised production plan.
Nonlinearities in either the objective function or in
the constraints may be solved by the linear decomposition
procedure as long as the objective function is concave or
the constraints are convex functions. However, the term-
ination of the procedure in a finite number of iterations
can no longer be assured. 10 An appropriate stopping rule
must be established to terminate the procedure.
Recently, several new algorithms may have been pro-
posed for the solution of decomposable problems of the
form with a concave nonlinear objective function and lin-
ear separable constraints. These algorithms employ gra-
dient search methods to achieve local optimum. l !
C. LINEAR MODEL WITH EXTERNALITIES
In the previous application of the Dantzig-Wolfe de-
composition procedure, an organization was modeled as if
it allocated its resources in an internal, perfectly com-
petitive economy. In the absence of externalities within
this internal economy, the perfectly competitive market
mechanism achieved an optimal organization plan through
1 o
Huysmans , J., Some Notes on the Decomposition Prin-
ciple, Externalities and Decentralization in the Firm,
Working Paper
,
No. 141, p. 13, 1965.
i i
Fletcher, R. , ed., "Large Step Gradient Methods for
Decomposable Nonlinear Programming Problems" by L. Schwartz,
Optimization
,
p. 106, Academic Press, 1969.
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the imputed price system. This neoclassical model pre-
sumes that departmental behavior is competitive in the
sense that each department acted out of "greed" to inde-
pendently bid resources away from other departments.
Viewed in contemporary organization theory, depart-
ments are assumed to be psychically and, on occasion, phy-
sically interdependent. Psychic interdependence is caused
by an overall spirit of departmental cooperation in
achieving the organization's objective beyond personal and
group rewards, incentives, or penalties. Physical inter-
dependence may occur if one or more departmental goals are
dependent upon other departmental goals. Both types of
interdependencies would be considered externalities in
the neoclassical model. No market exists to evaluate the
effects of externalities on the achievement of an optimal
organizational plan.
In contemporary organization theory, the presence of
externalities in the organization model requires some ad-
ditional form of information other than that provided in
the internal price system. 12 Thus, additional information
should serve to account for the beneficial or detrimental
contributions of externalities in pursuing an optimal plan
Malinvaud suggests that production goals may be used as
additional information in conjunction with the internal
1 2
Charnes, A., Clower, R. , and Kortaneck, K., "Ef-
fective Control Through Coherent Decentralization with
Preemptive Goals," Econometrica
,




price system. 13 This approach would approximate current
procedures used in business organizations and provide pos-
sible application and validation of these models. This
model insures that optimal achievement of departmental
goals will result in the optimal achievement of the or-
ganizational goal.
A brief discussion of the model is presented to in-
troduce the concept of goal decomposition and to provide
an intuitive grasp of the interaction of goal specifica-
tions and imputed prices to achieve organization decompo-
sition. Rigorous mathematical proof of the characteristics
of the model may be found [20].
Consider the following model of an organization con-








S.T. > C.u. > d
B.u. > b
.
j = 1 , . . . ,J






Malinvaud, E. and Barharach, M. 0. L., eds., "Decen-
tralized Procedures for Planning" by E. Malinvaud, Activity
Analysis in the Theory of Growth and Planning: Proceedings
of a Conference held bv the International Economic Associa -
tion
,





c. is a vector (Mxl) of fixed costs for the unit
level of the j tn departments activity,




C. is a matrix (MxJ) which describes how each de-
partment's production interacts to achieve the
organization's goals.
d is a vector (Jxl) of the central agency's ex-
ternal production goals.
B. is a matrix (MxJ) of the independent constraints
under the control of the j th department.
b. is a vector (Jxl) of the i tn departments minimum
production goals.
The central agency's problem is to minimize total pro-
duction cost subject to achieving minimal specified levels
of departmental and organizational production.
Now consider the dual formulation of this model at the
t*-*
1 iteration of the procedure.
J
V b'.xl 1^ + d' A (t) t = 1,...,T
{-> 3 3 '
MAX:
j-l
3 - 1 , . . . , J
S.T. B.x? 1^ + C.-A^ > c .
3 3 3 ~3





J is a vector (Jxl) of the central agency's imputed
value of one additional unit of production in the
j
tn department at the t tn iteration.
A^ ' is the central agency's vector (Jxl) of imputed
value of one additional unit of organizational
production at the t tn iteration.
The problem is to maximize the aggregate imputed value of
production subject to the requirement that aggregate imputed
marginal benefit of an additional unit of production must
at least equal the marginal cost of that unit of production
at each iteration.
At optimality the following equality exists:
J
y c!u^ t} * = y b.xv 1
j=l j-1
j + d X^ u;
— ft")* — —ft")* —ftl *Let a. J = C.uV J . Where a. J is the vector of optimal
3 3 3 3
F
organizational production goals measured in value units at
the t tn iteration.
—
f-n *
Provided with an optimal internal pricing system, X S J
,
at the t tn iteration, the j^n departmental problem is:
MIM: u^' fc.-C.X^ ]
3 3 3




— ft) *As mentioned previously, the price system, X * J , and
-ft) *




are provided for each department at each iteration. In
this context, a goal may be a vector or a scalar quantity
which relates the activity levels of the previous proposals
to the organizational production goals by some equational
representation. In this case, the equational representation
reflects the difference, if any, between the previous de-
partmental proposals and the organizational objectives.
The original j tn departmental problem may be written:
MTM Hit)' r- rT-(t)*, ,, || -(t)* -(t) V 11MIN: u> J fc.-CA v ^)+M a. J - u. C
S.T. B.u?^ > b.
uW > o
where "| |" means the sum of or the MAX of
I I—(t) * -7? I •-,{|aj - u. Cj
|
3}.
M is a positive real number representing an arbitrarily
large penalty cost for deviation from the value of the pro-
duction goals.
Intuitively, the minimization of the objective function
should cause a decrease in the value of the second term.
This may be interpreted as minimizing absolute deviations
from organizational production goals. Minimization of the




should cause this term to increase in absolute value. This
indicates that the optimal imputed value of production
levels should be at least as great as the cost of that
level of production at each iteration.
Assume that the central agency has established a goal
deviation tolerance as an optimality criterion. The pro-
— f11 *
cedure is initiated by generating a. J for j = 1,...,J
— f 11 *
and X v } by the organization from an existing or arti-
ficial basis of activity variables. Each department gen-
erates a new vector of activity levels from the supplied
information. In return, revised activity levels, u>
,
for j = 1,...,J, provide a new basis for reiteration of
the central agency's program producing a revised prospec-
f21 * — f 21 *tive index, (X v -*
,
a. J ). Subsequent exchanges of
prospective indices and proposals continue until an organ-
izational optimum defined by the specified deviation tol-
erance is achieved. This iterative procedure is described
in Figure 1.
D. LINEAR GOAL DECOMPOSITION MODEL
The Dantzig-Wolfe and preemptive goals decentralization
models were independent of the formal hierachical structure
of an organization. In these models, organizations were
structured on two levels, a planning level and an operations
level
.
In contemporary theory, organization structure reflects




















































within the organization to accomplish defined objectives.
Models which consider organizational structure provide a
means of including an environment in the analysis of the
decision processes within the organization. Structure de-
pendent models should implicitly reflect the effects of a
particular structure in a decision process. It is not
clearly evident whether the organizational structure can
be separated from the decision process for analysis or op-
timization .
The Generalized Goal Decomposition model proposed by
Ruefli [12] is a modified form of goal programming model
of an organization which does not exhibit departmental or
divisional externalities. The model is structure depen-
dent and goal oriented. A three level model will be dis-
cussed, but the procedure is applicable to any finite
number of organizational levels.
Consider an organization consisting of a central agency
and J departments. Each department consists of £., e =
1 , . .
.
,E • , divisions
.
The mathematical programming model of the organiza-













t = 1, . . . ,T





tF. * is a vector (lxM.)> m = 1,...,M., of the imputed
value of one unit of positive or negative deri-
vation from, the m"^n goal to the j th department
at the ttn iteration.
—ft)
g. is a vector (M.xl) of the goal levels assigned
to the j tn department.
P. is a matrix (M . xM
.
) of the J departments' joint
3 3 3
v J
utilization of organization resources.
J
g is a vector (Kxl) , K = .£.. M. of external con-5 o v ' j=l j
straint levels
.
At each t iteration, the central agency's problem is
to maximize the imputed value of aggregate departmental
output subject to some resource constraint.
The mathematical programming model of the j tn depart-
ment is as follows:
MIN: w?
+










x _ : F(*D + ! 7CO . ?Ct)Ea*- ^ -I y^'^ I y v ^ = ge . e . m. m. 6 j
e=l ^ 3 3 3









w. ,w. J are vectors (lxM.) of a priori weights for
positive or negative deviations from goals.
y> ,y. J are vectors (M.xl) of positive or negative




for the j tn department.
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achievement of departmental goals at the e*-*1
iteration.








At each t iteration, the j* department's problem is to
minimize it's aggregate weighted goal deviations subject to
the technology of achieving the department's goal. This tech
nology describes how the E. divisions interact to achieve
departmental goals.
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D is a matrix (M.xM.) of the e*-*1 division's tech-
no logy.





for the e^" division
f is a vector (M.xl) of minimum output levels.
At each iteration, the e"1-*1 division's problem is to
minimize the imputed value of their production subject to
the physical technology of that production.
The central agency initiates the procedure by provid-
ing J prospective indices, g°
,
for each of the j departments.
Each index contains production or resource goals for the j tn
department. The initial indices may reflect current operat-
ing conditions or mature jedgment in forecasting goal levels.
Each of the J departments, with a previous technology
coefficient vector, a , seeks to minimize the weighted de-
e
j
viations from their respective goals. At optimality, the
dual variables to this program solution are the shadow prices,
7T > ' . The J departments respond to the central agency with
a proposal of shadow prices. This vector of shadow prices
is provided to each of the divisions of the J departments
as a prospective index.
Having received a prospective index for this iteration,
the e division seeks to minimize the imputed value of its
production. The optimal solution of the e tn division program




Concurrently, after receiving the proposals, tt> , from
each department, the central agency optimizes it's revised
program providing new prospective indices, gV ' , to each de-
partment for the next iteration.
Provided with a new technology coefficient vector a^ '
by their respective divisions and new goal levels, g > } by
the central agency, each of the j departments optimizes the
revised program generating a new vector of shadow prices.



























The procedure terminates when the deviations from the
departments' goals are within prescribed tolerance limits or
at a minimum value for which no readjustment of central
agency's goals indices or the divisions proposals cause any
change in the department's objective functions.
Because the organizational model consists of processes
which are each finite and composable into one problem, the
entire processes will reach an optimum in a finite number of
iterations 1 k
i it
Byrne, F. R. and others, eds., "PPBS-An Analytic Ap
proach" by T. Ruefli, Studies in Budgeting
,
p. 173, North
Holland Publishing Company, 1971.
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If departmental or divisional externalities are rele-
vant to the model of organization, the Centralized Goal De-
composition model cannot achieve decentralization by prices
along. However, the preemptive goals procedure of decentral-
ization proposals in [20] may be used if the requisite con-
ditions of that model are met. The generalized goal
decomposition model is readily adaptable to the preemptive
goals procedure because the Centralized Goal Decomposition
and the preemptive goals are both based on goal programming.
E. NONLINEAR GOAL DECOMPOSITION MODEL
As a conjectural variation of the generalized goal de-
composition model, consider a hypothetical three level or-
ganization which consists of a central agency and J departments
Each department consists of E. divisions which may exhibit
production externalities within their respective departments
but not between departments. In this model production ex-
ternalities will occur when the output of one division shares
an intentional or unintentional characteristic with the out-
put of one other division. This condition exists when a
lesser included output, a by-product, of one division is the
same as the principal output of one other division of the
same department. This by-product is not accounted for in the
pseudo-market mechanism within the organization.
Recall that in a perfectly competitive market, this
production externality would not be reflected in the pricing
system. Likewise, in a decentralization model which relies
on an internal price system alone to provide the information
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necessary to achieve decentralization, this externality
would not be reflected in that internal pricing system.
If these externalities are not taken into account in the
decentralization model, solutions generated by that model
will be suboptimal.
Two possible ways of dealing with externalities are
to merge the divisions which generate this common output
or to restructure the model.
Divisional merger internalizes the by-product so that
its effects on organizational goal achievement are reflected
in the price system. Merger may be appropriate if the com-
mon output of related divisions is such that the organization
views this combined production of a common output to be more
important than the previous individual outputs. Merger may
decrease organizational information transaction costs which
are assumed to increase exponentially with organizational
expansion.
Divisional merger may be inappropriate if the budgeting
system or the time sequencing of related divisional activi-
ties requires that distinct divisional lines must be main-
tained. This condition may occur if the divisions represent
fixed duration projects or fixed budgetary categories.
A restructuring of the model should account for the ad-
ditional information required to reflect the beneficial or
detrimental effects of divisional externalities. As indicated
in the preemptive goals model, the internal price system of
the Dantzig-Wolfe model was insufficient to decentralize the
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organization with departmental externalities. The preemptive
goals in value form provided this additional information to
account for those externalities. The Dantzig-Wolfe model
was restructured to accommodate this view of organizational
behavior. This approach presupposed the ability of the cen-
tral agency to interpret deviations from organizational ob-
jectives in terms of departmental goals.
As a different approach to this process of generating
the supplementary information required for decentralization,
consider the pairwise divisional externalities of this hy-
pothetical organization as a type of departmental collective
good. It's collective properties stem from the necessity
of the department to consume the benefit or detriment of the
interactive output of interdependent divisions without ex-
clusion whenever both divisional activities operate at a
nonzero level. In light of this collective property, it be-
comes incumbent upon the department to account for the ef-
fects of these interactions in the goal achievement effort.
Under these conditions departments cannot be viewed as "de-
viation minimi zers" as proposed in the pure Generalized Goal
Decomposition model.
Consider the following mathematical programming formu-
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b > \ bi ' are scalar measures of the present, certain,




benefit or detriment derived from a unit level of activity
under the following conditions
:
b- > is the i tn division's beneficial






1 is replaced by b, J if e ^ k and divisions e and k
x^e . * • Ke
have a common beneficial output.
This replacement precludes double
counting of benefit in the objec-
tive function.
b{; ' is replaced by -bv; if e /= k and divisions e and k haveKe • ke
.
3 1
2 a common detrimental output. This
replacement precludes double count-
ing of detriment in the objective
function
.




It is assumed that b. , b, are commensurable for all
i . ' ke .
3 3
e and k. This commensurability may be achieved by using a
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suitable numeraire which generates an appropriate benefit
accounting system for all the divisions' outputs. The ob-
jective function formed from this accounting system is as-
sumed to be a concave function. 15








ithin the j tn department.
£ * is a scalar activity level of the k^h division
j
"as if" it were independent of all other divisions
within the jth department.
xi xv is a joint scalar activity level of the etn and
ktn divisions interdependent activity levels.
a. , a, are scalar technological coefficients under the
1





> is the i tn division's technological
j coefficient as if the i tn division
was independent
.





=0 if e f k and divisions e and k are
j independent.
g. is a vector (M.xl) of the goal constraints as-
signed to the j tn department by the central agency
The department's problem at each iteration is to maximize
the total present, certain, benefit of its departmental activ-
ities subject to the technological interaction of achieving
1 5
The quadratic term will be concave if the quadratic
form of that term is negative semi-definite.
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specified goals. But it must solve this problem contingent
upon the generation of the necessary information to structure
the problem at each iteration.
As in the previous models of organizational decentrali-
zation, a planning and controlling agency requires specific
information which it does not have the ability to accumulate
and process. Likewise, in this model the departments which
exhibit divisional production interactions require not only
the technical information needed by all departments without
divisional externalities but also they require additional
information to achieve their departmental objectives. Thus,
the informational requirement for these departments is of
two types: technical and artificial.
In this model it is assumed that departments use ^re-
spective indices to request specific technological informa-
tion from all their subordinate divisions. This technical
information is implicitly embedded in each divisional pro-
posal. Divisions are assumed to behave as if they were in-
dependent and ignorant of production externalities.
In this thesis, artificial information is a subjective
evaluation of the amount of benefit or detriment contributed
to departmental goal achievement by production externalities
between two interdependent divisions. This benefit or detri-
ment is reflected in the scalar value of:









for e f k and divisions e and k interdependent
It is assumed that this artificial information will be gener-
ated from divisional proposals by some form of logical analy-
sis or study initiated and accomplished by each department as
necessary.
Because of the nonlinearity of the objective function
and the nonlinearity of constraint equations, the solution of
the j th departments problem in its present form cannot be
achieved by linear or quadratic programming algorithms. Lin-
ear assumptions in the objective function or the constraint
equations would eliminate the interactive effects of inter-
dependent divisional activities.
Consider the Created Response Surface Technique formu-
lation of the j "*- departments program with some pairwise
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x-J, is a vector (M.xl) of activity
m J
levels of the E. divisions of
J
the j "th department at the mth
iteration of the gradient search
procedure of the response surface
technique
.
is the weighted reciprocal devia-
w.
gl." a l. Xl." a12. X l. x 2.
•* 3 3 J 3 J tion from the 1st departmental
goal consisting of:





a n is the technological level pro-
j.
.
posed by the I s division of the
j
tn department.
x, is the variable activity level of
j .
the l sr division.
a.. ?
is the interaction level proposed
by the jth department from received




visions %1 and 2 to account for op-
erating divisions 1 and 2 jointly
with some common output
.
x, x ? variable joint activity level of1. i.
divisions 1 and 2.
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r penalty term weighting factor
which serves as a benefit-goal
conversion factor in conjunc-
tion with each respective w.r 1
individual weighting factor.
X and Y are the penalty term associated
with the nonnegative constraints
of the variables.
The central agency initiates the procedure by providing
J prospective indices, g. , for each of the j departments.
Each index contains production goals for the jth department.
The initial indices may reflect current operating conditions
or mature judgment in forecasting goal levels.
Each of the j departments have available a previous
technology coefficient vector a? consisting of the proposed
1
3
technological coefficients of each of the E. divisions "as
if" each division were independent of each other. The j de-
partments determine among which of their respective divisions
production externalities exist. Once the interdependencies
are established, the technological level of interdependence
is determined by the department. The technology coefficients
from an upper triangular matrix whose diagonal elements are
the divisions' coefficients "as if" they were independent,
and the off diagonal elements are the positive coefficients
indicating divisional pairwise interdependency or zero in-
dicating divisional pairwise independence generated by the
j th department. Likewise, the appropriate benefit or detriment
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coefficients for each unit of independent activity and joint
activities are generated. The created response function is
optimized until an established optimality criterion is
achieved at this iteration. This particular vector of the
variable activity levels and penalty term weighting factor
generate a vector of dual variables, X^ ' , which serve as a
shadow price. This shadow price vector becomes a prospec-
tive index to each of the E. divisions of the jth department
and a proposal in response to the central agency's initial
index. The shadow price vector has accounted for the di-
visional externalities.
The e^h division seeks to minimize the imputed value of
its production. Embedded in this process is an accounting
f\ -P - n o l r\ "f* o "V* *-) r* + "i r>T-% r-\ -P -f-V»£i p Ull ^-t>r-ic~i'"*'»-"* t,m +*n -f-V\rv V L II W-i-»r-»r;-»'-*-r*^
-t. w - i w xulU i avk-x^/ii \s j-- L.11C <- ^. .1 k -l j x v i 1 r«x wii L- a * w i.v U j. v j. O J. vJli •
This interaction is reflected in the shadow price which was
computed for this iteration by using technical and artificial
information. The optimal solution of the i th division pro-
gram provides a proposal a. * for its respective department.
lj
mAfter receiving proposals, XV , from each department,
the central agency optimizes its revised program providing
new prospective indices, g. , to each department.
Provided with a new technology coefficient vector a. '
-Cll jfrom their respective divisions and new goal levels, g. J
,
each of the j departments determine which divisions are in-
terdependent since at any iteration it may be optimal not
to operate some activities at a positive level. Once these
interdependencies are established, the technology coefficients
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and benefit coefficients are generated or altered as ap-
propriate. The created response function is optimized
— f 21generating a new vector of shadow prices X . J reflecting
the revised goals, technological coefficients and effects
of externalities.
The procedure terminates if the change in total bene
fit is within a prescribed tolerance limit or at a value
for which no readjustment of central agency prospective
indices or divisions proposals causes any significant
(a departmental criterion) change in the department's ob-
jective function.



























In this thesis the Created Response Surface Technique
of solving a class of nonlinear mathematical programs was
applied to nonlinear models of the firm. The interpreta-
tion of the necessary conditions to the primal and dual
problem formulations were viewed in a neoclassical economic
context and a contemporary organizational context. The
decision rules represented by these interpretations charac-
terized optimal behavior. Based upon the presentation of
several linear models of decentralized planning procedures,
a nonlinear model of decentralized planning procedures was
proposed. An interpretation of the Created Response Sur-
clV-<J lUllilUlalxOu Ox (.Jiat iiiO vJ-l- i j/iuviu^u buju^ j. iii) a. ^*1 c o jlh^u




APPENDIX A: MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING - THEOREMS AND
DEFINITIONS
T
1. A function is said to be convex \ over a convex set
concave
if x, jX^eS
fCXCx^ + ci-x)^)! " xfCx^ + (i-x) f(x
2 )
< X < 1
2. The sum of a finite number of convex functions is a
convex function.
3. The reciprocal of a concave function is a convex func-
tion .
4. If f(x) is a convex function, then -f(x) is a concave
function
.
5. Let g.(x), i= 1,...,I be a convex I functions. Then6 i ^ J ' ' ' Iconcavel
the set S defined by:







is a convex set.
, „, , - j r . , . u +.X. /minimization] ^r6. The convex problem is defined to be the
|max i m i zat ion
Iconve x i function over a convex set.
concave] »
- -, , , /minimum] r convex £ ,„. - „, rrt „ „7. Every local - of a „ I function over a7
I maximum/ [concave/
. , ' ,
-, /minimum\
convex set is also a global • 1 .& JmaximumJ
8. A function L(x,X
n
)< L(xQ , A„) < L(x fl ,X).
9. Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualification:
Let x satisfy (g-(x)>0, i = 1,...,I} and let dx be
any vector differential such that Vg.(x)dx>0^i such
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g. (x) = 0; then dx is tangent to some arc contained
in the set of all x satisfying {g.(x)>0}.
1
10. The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for the existence
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